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Israel, Hezbollah and the Conflict in Lebanon:
An Act of Aggression or Self-Defense?
by Victor Kattan*

According to Israel, the war started with a cross-border raid
by Hezbollah that led to the capture of two soldiers. Israel retaliated by sending a group of soldiers into Lebanon in hot pursuit.8
After the Israeli soldiers crossed the border they were killed in an
ambush by Hezbollah guerillas when their tank drove over a mine
(three soldiers were killed in the initial operation, four by the mine
and another in the rescue mission).9 In retaliation Israel launched
Operation Change of Direction in which the Israeli army Chief of
Staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, threatened to “turn back the clock in
Lebanon by twenty years.”10 In contrast, Hezbollah claims that Israel
initiated the conflict by sending its soldiers into Aitaa al-Chaab
(Ayta Al-Sha’b), a Lebanese village just north of the Israeli border.11
The G8, which was meeting in St. Petersburg at the time the
violence broke out, accepted Israel’s justification but cautioned
Israel to be mindful of the strategic and humanitarian consequences of its actions.12 On August 5, 2006, the text of a draft
Security Council resolution was published in the New York Times.13
It is apparent from preambular paragraph 2 of the draft that the
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he legal issues surrounding the use of force,
known to international lawyers as jus ad bellum, have
once again been thrust into the legal limelight as a
result of recent Israeli military action in Lebanon.
Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International
accused Israel of deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure and
committing war crimes during the month-long conflict.1 Amnesty
said that Israel’s strikes on civilian buildings and structures went
beyond “collateral damage,” amounting to indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks contrary to the Geneva Conventions and the
laws of war.2 It released aerial photographs that showed suburbs in
Beirut being reduced to “grey wastelands” as a result of Israeli
bombing. According to a study Amnesty undertook with its field
workers in Lebanon, Israel launched more than 7,000 air strikes
against that country and naval vessels launched 2,500 shells.3
This article will assess the factual situation that led to the conflict and will compare Israel’s response to the principles and norms
of international law as set out in the Charter of the United Nations
(UN Charter), the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), and the writings of legal scholars. This paper will not
address the extent to which Israel’s actions in Lebanon amount to
a breach of international humanitarian law and what possible consequences might arise from this conclusion. Rather, it will focus on
the rules regarding the recourse to armed force.
It is submitted that Israel’s bombardment, blockade, and subsequent invasion of southern Lebanon could not be excused as an
act of self-defense under international law, as these actions were
clearly unnecessary and disproportionate. Rather, it would seem
that Israel’s actions, being both offensive and punitive, would be
more accurately described as acts of aggression contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

The Factual Background

A school in the Lebanese village of Bint Jbeil hit by Israeli missiles.

On July 12, 2006, a frontier dispute between the Israeli Army
and the armed wing of Hezbollah rapidly developed into a fullscale armed conflict, leaving hundreds of civilians (mostly
Lebanese) dead. Only the passing of UN Security Council
Resolution 1701 brought a respite to the 34 days and nights of
intense fighting in which approximately 1,164 people (mostly
civilians) were killed.4 Of these, 162 were Israeli (of whom 119
were military personnel).5 Nearly 900,000 Lebanese and 300,000
Israelis were displaced from their homes with the former having little to return to as the Israeli military had caused extensive destruction to southern Lebanon with an intense bombing campaign.6
When a ceasefire was declared on August 14, at 8 a.m. local time,
there were some 30,000 Israeli troops stationed inside Lebanon,
south of the Litani River.7

Council considered Hezbollah’s attack on Israel of July 12 the
aggravating factor which led to the spiral of violence in the Middle
East. Notably, it does not use the expression “armed attack” associated with Article 51 of the UN Charter which proscribes the extent
to which a state may legitimately defend itself under international
law. In the actual text of resolution 1701 adopted unanimously six
days later, the preambular and operative paragraphs referred to in
the draft above were left unchanged.

International Law and the Use of Force
Recourse to war as a means of solving international controversies was outlawed by the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact)
in 1928. It was also restricted by the Charter of the League of
Nations drafted at the end of the Great War (1914-18). The
Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act
restricted the scope of state resort to armed force still further. The
UN Charter provides in Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in
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Israel thus reserves the right to act in accordance with Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations and exercise its right of
self-defence when an armed attack is launched against a
Member of the United Nations. The State of Israel will take the
appropriate actions to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers
and bring an end to the shelling that terrorizes our citizens.14

In Nicaragua v. United States of America, the ICJ ruled that
“the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a state
of armed bands to the territory of another state, if such operation,
because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an
armed attack rather than a mere frontier incident had it been carried
out by regular armed forces.”15 Thus, the attack has to be of a certain scale and inter-state in character. It must be serious, not trivial,
and it is clear that frontier disputes do not amount to armed attacks.
The jurisprudence of the court in the Nicaragua case was recently
upheld in the Oil Platforms case,16 the Wall advisory opinion,17 and
the case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo18.
For the sake of argument, it will be assumed that the Israeli
version of events is correct — Hezbollah started the conflict by
capturing two soldiers, killing several others, and firing a salvo of
rockets into Israeli border villages on July 14. Even so, it is not
entirely clear whether Israel can claim a right of self-defense under
the UN Charter. As established in Nicaragua, Israel can make a
legitimate claim under Article 51 only if the attack by Hezbollah
could be classified as an “armed attack” and not a mere frontier
incident.
The Nicaragua court’s reasoning, however, is not without criticism.19 American academia, in particular, has criticized the court
on the issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the armed attack
— that it must be directed from a state.20 This is because Article
51 is silent on the state requirement and the travaux preparatoire
provide no explanation for this anomaly. Rather, the state requirement was the consensus interpretation placed upon the definition
of an armed attack in Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression
annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314, passed in the mid1970s when wars of national liberation were in vogue. Yet, despite
these criticisms, the state requirement still remains the majority
interpretation advanced by students of the Charter according to a

recent study on the subject.21 They point out that Article 51 is an
exception to the prohibition on the use of force contained in
Article 2(4) which only applies to states. And of course the Charter
only applies to its members which are restricted by Article 4(1) to
“peace-loving” states.22
Whether the law has changed in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks so as to apply to non-state actors according to state practice
and opinio juris is open to debate. It should be stressed that the
practice by states like Israel, the U.S., and even the UK, as highlighted in articles by legal scholars, are not universally accepted as
representing the current state of international law on the use of
force and self-defense.23 On the other hand, the fact that the G8
referred Hezbollah specifically, rather than Lebanon, may be evidence of a new custom emerging.24 In any event, for the sake of
argument, it will be assumed that Article 51 permits a state to
defend itself in the event of an armed attack by a non-state actor
— but only if there is a certain link with a state.25
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their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”
Today, the prohibition of aggression is universally considered
to have reached the status of a jus cogens norm. In fact crimes associated with war entail individual criminal responsibility, and the
military commanders implicated in such atrocities can be indicted
before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
Alternatively, they can be tried in the courts of third states under
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. This is relevant in the present situation since neither Israel nor Lebanon is a State Party to the
Rome Statute.
To make a legitimate claim of self-defense under international law, reference must be made to Article 51 of the UN Charter
which provides in part: “Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Israel’s UN Ambassador
referenced Article 51 on July 12, in identical letters to the UN
Secretary-General and the Security Council. He wrote:

Hundreds of homes in the Lebanese village of Bint Jbeil reduced to rubble.

Aggression or Self-Defense?
The crux of the issue, therefore, is whether Hezbollah’s attack
was so grave as to trigger the applicability of Article 51. While the
attack may not independently trigger Article 51, Israel could
invoke the Nadelstichtaktik (needle prick) doctrine, also known as
the “accumulation of events theory.” According to the
Nadelstichtaktik doctrine, each specific act of terrorism, or needle
prick, though it may not independently qualify as an armed attack,
could, taking into consideration the totality of incidents, amount
to an armed attack entitling the victim state to respond with armed
force.26 Therefore, although the events of July 14 in isolation
would likely not trigger Article 51, under Nadelstichtaktik the several incidents prior to July 14 may allow Israel to argue that it does.
Since Nadelstichtaktik is just a theory and not a rule of international law, it carries little juridical weight. The ICJ, however,
seems to have considered the doctrine in its judgment on
Nicaragua27 and more recently in armed activities in the Congo.28
While the court lacked sufficient evidence to rule conclusively on
the matter in both cases, it appears from the ICJ’s jurisprudence
that the doctrine requires a series of attacks to be “collective,”
“cumulative in character,” and attributable to a state.29
27
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If Israel is permitted to invoke the Nadelstichtaktik theory, it
could just as easily be used by Lebanon, for Israel frequently enters
Lebanon’s territorial waters without its consent. Furthermore, the
Lebanese government accuses Israel of regularly violating its airspace between May 2000 and July 2006.30 Lebanon considers these
incursions “a form of international terrorism,” alleging that these
low-altitude flights break the sound barrier over civilian-populated
areas and “instill terror among Lebanese civilians, especially children.”31
In a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General, Lebanon
described these flights as “unlawful acts of aggression and provocation.”32 The letter said that Lebanon would “exercise its natural
and lawful right of self-defence, opposing them with ground antiaircraft fire.”33 Israel also has a long history of launching major
attacks upon that country (in 1968, 1973, 1978, 1982, 1993,
1996, and 1999) and has left thousands of land mines in the south
which the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child found Israel
responsible (Israel was an occupying power in southern Lebanon
from 1982-2000).34 On the basis of the Nadelstichtaktik doctrine,
Lebanon could therefore claim a right of self-defense which would
preclude Israel from doing so as two states cannot validly assert
such a right.
Moreover, even if the Nadelstichtaktik doctrine is applicable,
it would not justify Israel’s recent war against Lebanon. The border has been relatively stable since Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, although there have been several clashes
within the Blue Line (in Lebanon) in the Shabaa Farms area. Yet
Israel did not respond with such overwhelming force in its previous clashes with Hezbollah. One may question why Israel felt the
need to respond so aggressively in the summer of 2006. Regardless
of the various theories advanced in support of military action, it
must be emphasized that the use of force in international relations
is subject to the conditions of proportionality and necessity.35 This
means that a state may only use force that is necessary to repel an
armed attack and its response must be proportional to that attack.
After all, the whole raison d’être of the UN Charter is to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”
It should be clearly stated that Israel may not resort to selfhelp in an attempt to coerce the Lebanese government to act
against Hezbollah. The right of states to use force to enforce international law was outlawed by the UN Charter. In the Corfu
Channel case, the ICJ declared that British mine-sweeping operations in Albanian territorial waters without the latter’s consent
amounted to “the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in
the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot,
whatever be the present defects in international organization, find
a place in international law.”36
Nor may Israel resort to armed reprisals.37 This is clear from
the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations which declares
that “[s]tates have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving
the use of force.” Having said this it is highly questionable whether
Israel’s actions in Lebanon could even be described as reprisals
since under pre-Charter law these were also subject to the conditions of necessity and proportionality.38 Israel’s actions would
therefore more accurately be described as acts of aggression which
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg characterized as
an offence in 1945.39 It should also be said that Israel’s blockade of
Lebanon’s ports and coastline is also deemed by the UN to consti-

Human rights activists pick their way through the rubble of a flattened
neighborhood in Al-Dahiya, a southern suburb of Beirut, after an Israeli attack.

tute an “act of aggression.”40 If maintained effectively — as it was
for over one month — it could further be considered an armed
attack allowing Lebanon to defend itself under Article 51.41
Furthermore, the Israeli attack cannot be justified as selfdefense because, in the words of Daniel Webster in the famous
Caroline incident, there was not a “necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of
deliberation.”42 As a regional superpower Israel had plenty of other
means and the arsenal available to respond differently if it so
wished, whether by commando action, police action, or through
diplomacy. The fact that Israel did not even give the Lebanese government the opportunity to arrest and detain the suspects on its soil
before resorting to the use of force — which should always be a
means of last resort, is revealing. Israel has exchanged prisoners with
Hezbollah before, and it could have done so again.43
It is submitted that Hezbollah’s July 14 attack on Israel did
not threaten its territorial integrity or political independence, the
only grounds for justifiable war.44 Rather, the converse is true:
Israel’s bombardment of Lebanon’s major cities and its full-scale
invasion of the south threatened its existence and political independence as a sovereign nation. Even if Israel could resort to
Article 51 — assuming that it was subject to an armed attack — it
would seem that Israel exhausted that right when it pursued the
guerillas into Lebanon in the aftermaths of the initial attack.
28

Israel’s actions were neither necessary nor proportionate to the
scale of the threat posed by Hezbollah. So even if, for arguments
sake, Israel’s actions did fall within the Article 51 exemption, its
actions were both disproportionate and unnecessary.
Indeed, it might be questioned whether Israel’s actions in
Lebanon were defensive at all, as many of the tactics it undertook
could be characterized as offensive and even punitive. During the
Israeli army’s operation Summer Rain in the Gaza Strip in June
2006 (immediately preceding events in Lebanon), which took
place after the armed wing of Hamas captured an Israeli soldier in
reaction to a series of Israeli rocket and mortar attacks which left
many Palestinian women and children dead, Amir Peretz, Israel’s
Defense Minister, said: “We will take revenge against anyone who
injures the soldier, including their leaders.”45 Words like “revenge”,
“turning back the clock” or “mortal blow” (which was used by Ariel
Sharon to refer to his Gaza disengagement plan which was implemented in September 2005) can hardly be described as defensive.46

It would more likely seem that Hezbollah’s initial raid on July 12
was a classic frontier dispute falling outside the scope of Article 51.
Whether the Nadelstichtaktik doctrine is relevant depends on
facts which are always hard to verify in cross-border disputes,
which is probably one reason why they are excluded from the scope
of an armed attack. In these circumstances, there are sound policy
reasons not to confuse border incidents with armed attacks. The
insistence on a high threshold for an armed attack in Nicaragua
was to limit third party involvement, which the use of necessity
and proportionality alone would not exclude.52 Muslim organizations have already been quick to advance the argument that
“Lebanon has an inherent right to call other States to aide its selfdefense efforts” by citing the example of Kuwait’s call on the U.S.
for help when attacked by Iraq in 1990.53
The ICJ, in its advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons, upheld
its decision in Nicaragua that the exercise of self-defense is subject
to the conditions of necessity and proportionality which it said is
a rule of customary international law.54 Even if it turns out that
Hezbollah’s raid of July 12 was much more serious than was initially thought to have been the case, it is doubtful that Israel’s response
can be justified as either necessary or proportionate to the threat
posed by Hezbollah. Israel did not restrict its actions to Hezbollah
but launched air strikes against the Lebanese army, which played
no role in the initial attack. Israel also launched attacks close to the
border with Syria.55 In the process it killed over 1,000 civilians,
destroyed 30,000 homes, 120 bridges, 94 roads, 24 fuel stations
(causing a shortage of supply) and 900 businesses, which is hardly
proportionate to the deaths of three soldiers and the capture of
two.56 If one were to conclude that Israel’s actions were neither
necessary nor proportionate it would be very difficult not to agree
with the statement by the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent
Mission of Lebanon to the UN, that what had taken place was an
act of aggression even if it was not, as has been alleged, a premeditated act.57 HRB

Concluding Remarks
In spite of misgivings amongst scholars on the scope of the
right of self-defense and the use of force in international law, particularly on the question of how much force is necessary for it to
amount to an armed attack,47 it is submitted that, in the aftermath
of the 9/11 atrocities, trans-boundary attacks by non-state actors
may amount to an armed attack triggering the applicability of
Article 51.48 Even so, this is provided that: (a) there is a sufficient
link with a state; and (b) the attacks are of a sufficient scale and
effect (meaning, they are not trivial).
It is arguable whether the right of self-defense would be relevant to territory which is subject to belligerent occupation, particularly if it is prolonged and protracted.49 In that case it is submitted that the law of occupation effectively derogates from the right
of self-defense in Article 51 of the Charter.50 Since Israel withdrew
from southern Lebanon in 2000, this issue is of no consequence.51
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